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There have been increasing concerns about the security issues of wireless transmis-
sion of multimedia in recent years. Wireless networks, by their nature, are more
vulnerable to external intrusions than wired ones. Many applications demand
authenticating the integrity of multimedia content delivered wirelessly. In this
work, we describe a framework for jointly coding and authenticating multimedia
to be delivered over heterogeneous wireless networks. We firstly introduce a novel
concept called Unequal Authenticity Protection (UAP), which unequally allocate
resources to achieve an optimal authentication result. We then consider integrating
UAP with specific source and channel coding models, to obtain optimal end-to-
end quality by the means of Joint Source-Channel-Authentication (JSCA) analysis.
Lastly, we present an implementation of the proposed joint coding and authenti-
cation system on a progressive JPEG coder. Experimental results demonstrate
that the proposed approach is indeed able to achieve the desired authentication of
multimedia over wireless networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wireless multimedia applications have grown tremendously with the increasing
availability of bandwidth and the popularity of multimedia-enabled mobile devices.
During the past decade, research topics on wireless multimedia have received much
attention. Many researchers have been concentrating on designing robust and effi-
cient schemes for delivering multimedia content over error-prone wireless networks.
However, very few works have paid attention to the security aspect of such trans-
mission. In fact, comparing to wired networks, malicious intruders have a greater
possibility of accessing and modifying content delivered over wireless networks.
There are a growing number of applications that demand authenticating multi-
media data delivered over the heterogeneous wireless networks. Examples include
displaying sample products via mobile terminals in m-commerce, sending critical
medical images for remote diagnosis and consultation, transmitting portraits of
criminal suspects from law enforcement headquarter to the police officers’ mobile
devices, intelligence satellites sending reconnaissance images of battlefields, and
1
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transmission of surveillance video to the mobile terminals .
Current technologies offer data authentication in a strict sense, i.e., if a single
bit is flipped, no matter what causes such change, the authentication shall fail.
This authentication method may be more appropriate for conventional data, but
not for multimedia, since a simple bit-flip may not change the semantic meaning of
multimedia content. On the other hand, in wireless networks, the possible trans-
mission errors could be significant due to ambient interferences, and the bit errors
and packet losses are inevitable. Therefore, there is a strong need for designing
robust content-aware authentication schemes for multimedia.
Recently, preliminary research [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] have been developed to provide
robust authentication based on the invariant features extracted from the multime-
dia content (we call them content-level approaches). Typically these schemes have
been designed with the aim of surviving generalized distortions without assuming
the source of such distortions. For example, when authenticating an image, they
would not differentiate the distortions caused by image compression and channel
noise. However, in wireless multimedia applications, since we have the a priori
knowledge that the distortions are mainly from the error-prone wireless channel,
we expect to achieve even better authentication performance if we can exploit the
wireless channel information in designing our systems (e.g. by making the system
channel-adaptive).
To capture and utilize the channel information, it would be best to consider au-
thentication in the stream level. However, typical stream authentication employs
data-oriented MAC/hashing algorithms that are not error-robust. In this work, we
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adopt a content-aware stream-level approach for authenticating multimedia con-
tent. The general idea is to packetize the multimedia data in a content-aware man-
ner while applying authentication on a packet-by-packet basis. Beside the advan-
tage mentioned earlier, there are two other distinctive advantages of this approach.
First, although the underlying algorithm is data-oriented crypto hashing, it is pos-
sible to offer robust authentication on the global level. The content-aware strategy
allows this approach to differentiate the importance of packets. On the global
level, we can consider the content as authentic as long as the sum of unauthentic
packets’ weights does not exceed a threshold. Therefore, the authentication does
not depend on every single bit, but rather the more significant parts of the content.
Second, this approach facilitates a way to integrate authentication into the Joint
Source-Channel Coding (JSCC) framework to achieve both channel-adaptiveness
and bandwidth-efficiency. Note that similar content-aware strategy has been ap-
plied particularly to authenticating JPEG-2000 images in [7]. In this work, we do
not assume any particular multimedia format, and the proposed framework can be
applied to either audio, image or video content.
The main contributions of this research lies in i) the introduction of the new
concept in Unequal Authenticity Protection (UAP), ii) the quantitative analysis
of relationship between protection and resource, and iii) the realization of a joint
source-channel-authentication (JSCA) resource allocation framework. The intro-
duction of UAP allows us to achieve optimal bit allocation with the limited bit
budget for authentication. This is crucial for multimedia since the bits in the com-
pressed multimedia data contribute differently to the final media reconstruction
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at the receiving end. With UAP, we are able to allocate more resources to more
important bits, and vice versa. The quantitative analysis of the relationship be-
tween protection and bit budget is the key to the successful realization of practical
resource allocation for UAP through the introduction of authentication probability
and the construction of authentication graph. The final realization of the JSCA is
the highlight of the proposed approach because the ultimate goal of such system
is to achieve an optimal end-to-end multimedia quality under the overall limited
resource budget. The JSCA framework is able to facilitate the design of optimal
authentication against channel packet loss resulting from multimedia transmission
over wireless networks. Based on the general JSCA framework, we have developed
a joint coding and authentication system for the progressive JPEG coder. The
results from JPEG coder implementation clearly demonstrate that the proposed
JSCA is very effective for authenticating multimedia data transmitted over wireless
networks.
The remaining part of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we
briefly introduce the background of joint source-channel coding and hash-chaining-
based stream authentication. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the proposed
joint coding and authentication system. Some related issues such as packetization
and authentication procedures are also discussed. Chapter 4 describes UAP – the
methodology and algorithm that unequally allocate resources to achieve an optimal
authentication result. In Chapter 5, we consider the problem of joint resource
allocation among source coding, channel coding and authentication. Chapter 6
presents an implementation of the proposed JSCA framework on the progressive
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JPEG image coding. The experiment results are presented and discussions are
offered in this chapter. Conclusions are drawn in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Joint Source-Channel Coding
JSCC has been considered to be the most promising scheme for multimedia com-
munication over wireless channels, because of its ability to cope with varying chan-
nel conditions and to approach the theoretical bounds of transmission rates. It
is worth noting that although Shannon’s separation theorem [8] states that in a
communication system we can optimize the source coding and the channel coding
separately without sacrificing the overall performance, it is only true upon the as-
sumption of asymptotically long block lengths of data, which is impractical in real
world communication system. Moreover, this theorem is only valid for a single user
point-to-point case. If we extend the communication scenario to multiuser case,
separation theorem does not hold in general. When these assumptions break down,
joint consideration of source coding and channel coding can always achieve per-
formance gains. JSCC is often applied to the scenario of transmitting multimedia
6
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content over a lossy channel. The problem can be formulated as follows. Let X(i)
be the original value of Sample i of the source, Xˆ(i) the reconstructed value after
source coding at the sender and X˜(i) the reconstructed value at the receiver. The
expected end-to-end distortion is D = E{[X(i)− X˜(i)]2}. We can also define the
source coding distortion and channel coding distortion as Ds = E{[X(i)− Xˆ(i)]2}
and Dc = E{[Xˆ(i) − X˜(i)]2}, respectively. If we assume that Ds and Dc are un-
correlated (which is usually true, see [9]), we have D = Ds + Dc. The goal of
JSCC is to minimize the overall distortion D under a given resource (coding bits)
constraint, by optimally allocating source coding and channel coding bits.
2.2 Hash-Chaining-Based Stream Authentication
Signature Amortization through Hash-Chaining (SAHC) [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] is a
class of stream-level authentication methods that allows to verify a potentially
long stream. Although initially intended for IP multicast, this signature-based
approach is able to protect data integrity while ensuring non-repudiation. There-
fore, it is useful for general authentication applications when digital evidence is
concerned. Other merits of this approach include achieving both low computation
and communication overhead, and resisting to packet loss. We consider adopting
this approach as the underlying authentication algorithm in this research to take
advantage of these desirable merits.
The major motivation of applying SAHC is to reduce the expensive costs of
current digital signature schemes when applied to streams. Direct application of



























Figure 2.1. Illustration of SAHC. a) Basic scheme. b) Packet-loss-resistant scheme.
digital signatures (e.g., RSA, DSA) for stream authentication are expensive in
terms of computation and communication overhead. SAHC is a more practical so-
lution in that it organizes packets into groups and sign only one packet within each
group. The authenticity of the rest of the packets is guaranteed in the following
way – if we compute the hash of packet Pi and append it to packet Pi+1 before
signing Pi+1, then the authenticity of Pi+1 also guarantees the authenticity of Pi.
In this manner, each packet is hash-chained to the succeeding packets up to the
signature packet (Psig). The authenticity of the signature packet will “propagate”
through all the rest of packets within the group (refer to Fig.2.1 a)).
However, in case of multimedia over wireless networks, it is inevitable that there
will be packet loss during transmission. In order to ensure that the authentication
chain is not broken due to packet loss, each packet may assign its hash to multiple
Chapter 2. Literature Review 9
other packets (refer to Fig.2.1 b)). It is important to note that some packets may
not be verified due to the loss of other packets, even if it is received. The parameter
Authentication Probability (AP) is used to describe how likely a packet is verifiable
when it is received. Formally, AP of Packet i is denoted by ξi, and defined as
ξi = Pr(Pi is verifiable |Pi is received). Designing the entire authentication scheme
can be abstracted as constructing an effective directed acyclic Authentication Graph
(AG) (with nodes being the packets, and edges being the hash-chains), which is
able to achieve high APs. AP of a node is determined by the status of the nodes
it is chained to. More precisely, if we denote the event that Pi is verifiable by Λi,
and the event that Pi is received by Πi, then:
ξi = Pr(ΛjΠj + ΛkΠk + ...) (2.1)
where Pj, Pk,... are Pi’s hash-chained packets. In general, the more hash-chains
it has, the higher the AP. Also note that within an AG, different nodes may have
different APs. In this case, we may use ξmin = mini(ξi) as a measure of the entire
AG’s AP.
There have been many variants of SAHC, which mainly differ from each other
in terms of AG construction and the type of loss resistant to (e.g. bursty loss
vs. distributed random loss). We briefly review them as follows. Gennaro and
Rohatgi [10] initially propose the idea of using hash-chains to reduce the overhead
for signing a stream. Although their proposal is simple and does not consider the
packet loss issue, it nevertheless serves as a good starting point for the researchers
to follow. In [11], Perrig et al. present Efficient Multi-chained Stream Signature
(EMSS), which offers resistance to packet loss by randomly assigning hash-chains
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to other packets. They experimentally illustrate that this approach is efficient
enough for constructing good AGs. In [12], Miner and Staddon demonstrate a
statistical approach of AG construction and establish a lower bound of achievable
AP. However, the lower bound becomes loose when the number of edges increase.
Instead of adopting the statistical approach, other researchers look at deterministic
AG constructions to achieve AP optimizations. Golle and Modadugu [13] propose
Augmented Chain (AC), a static two-stage AG construction algorithm which resists
bursty packet loss. Zhang et al. [14] propose a butterfly-graph-based AG which
deterministically decorrelates dependency between nodes and therefore improves
APs. However, one shortcoming of the deterministic approach is that they often
impose constraints on the total number of nodes of the graph, and number of
hash-chains for each node. These inflexibilities prevent us from adopting them
in this work. For example, in AC, the number of hash-chains per packet is fixed
at 2, which makes it impossible to situations where unequal resource allocation
is required. In Chapter 6, we will mainly benchmark our proposed method with
EMSS, which provides resource allocation flexibilities.
Chapter 3
System Description
The proposed joint coding and authentication system is shown in Fig.3.1. At the
sender end, the multimedia content (either audio, video or image) is firstly passed
to the JSCA Analysis module, where its Rate-Distortion (R-D) characteristic is
analyzed. Information on channel condition such as Bit Error Rate (BER) or
Symbol Error Rate (SER) is also fed into this module. This module runs the JSCA
resource allocation algorithm, and outputs the optimal source code rate, channel
code rate and authentication rate (i.e., the bit budget used for overhead of hashes),
which are then passed to the following modules. The Source Encoding module
encodes the multimedia according to the source rate and outputs the compressed
codestream. In the Packet Signing / Channel Encoding module, AG is constructed
using the UAP algorithm; the codestream is packetized, signed and protected by
channel coding (or Forward Error Correction (FEC)) before transmission. At the
receiver end, error correction is firstly performed on the received stream in the
Channel Decoding module. Residue errors may still exist in the output stream
11






























Figure 3.1. Block diagram of the proposed coding and authentication system.
passed to the source decoder. We assume the source decoder to be an error-resilient
one, where techniques such as synchronization mark and CRC checksum are applied
to the codestream. Such mechanisms are intended to detect the residue errors
and allow error concealment techniques to alleviate the cost of error sensitivity of
compressed codestream due to entropy coding. The error report information is
also passed to the Packet Verification module. Note that bit errors would trigger
verification false alarms, and thus it is important to skip packets with bit errors
during authentication. The Packet Verification module performs packet-by-packet
verification based on SAHC. An overall decision on the content authenticity is
made based on all the packet verification results (see Section 3.2). The verifiability
information is passed to the Source Decoding module, so that during multimedia
decoding, those non-verifiable packets are skipped.
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In this work, we consider a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) model. Both
the AWGN and the Rayleigh fading channels can be represented as BSC. Also, we
use SER to characterize the channel conditions, since the channel coding scheme
considered is 8-bit symbol based.
It is worth noting that the practical IP-based network architecture involves
multiple layers which facilitate independent design and interoperability between
modules. However, this layered approach would introduce redundancy and inef-
ficiency. In this work, we consider a bit-oriented network where the multi-layer
constraint is ignored. The results presented could nevertheless serve as a bench-
mark for further considering incorporating the joint coding and authentication
system in a layered architecture.
3.1 Content-Aware Packetization
This section describes the packetization method. To apply UAP to the codestream,
the premise is to packetize the codestream in an content-aware manner. The packe-
tization scheme must be able to differentiate the importance of packets. We use the
term content packet to denote the compressed codestream unit after source coding
which is decodable only when every bit within the packet is correctly received,
and the term network packet for the datagram after packetization. Note that here
by the term content we refer to the entropy-coded transform domain coefficients,
which can be considered as some low-level semantic features. In general, this term
is used for high level or low level semantic features or objects in the context of im-
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age/video analysis and retrieval. In this work, however, we restrict our attention
to the low-level features directly available from the source coding algorithm.
Conventional packetization schemes are designed with the aim of re-distributing
the errors into many channel blocks to facilitate error correction. Each content
packet is interleaved and re-distributed into many network packets (see Fig. 3.2a)).
In other words, the network packets are made orthogonal to the FEC blocks.
The resulting network packets carry equal importance, and thus the importance-
differentiation requirement is not satisfied.
Inspired by the concept of smart packetization with pre-interleaving developed
in [15, 16], we propose the following packetization scheme, illustrated in Fig. 3.2
b) (together with FEC and SAHC signing). In this method, since each content
packet is packetized in one network packet only, the signing operation of that net-
work packet can be directly associated with the multimedia content, and each net-
work packet has differentiated importance. Also note that the error re-distribution
property is unaltered, since the orthogonality of FEC and network packets is main-
tained.
One additional merit offered by this packetization strategy is that a burst of
bit errors would fall into one or several content packets, instead of being scattered
into many. Consequently, a burst of bit errors would not cause a burst of packet
losses (we consider a packet being lost when bit errors in that packet result in
source decoder error report). Therefore, the packet loss rate is reduced and packet
loss pattern de-correlated. If the burst is not too long, it would be reasonable to
assume memoryless packet loss in Chapter 4.
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3.2 Authentication Procedure
Fig. 3.3 describes the authentication procedure. The error report information for
each packet has been fed from the error-resilient source decoder. If errors have
been detected, the packet is skipped for verification. (Note that an error may not
be detected by the decoder, and this may cause authentication false alarm. Given
a more stringent false alarm rate bound, we can always choose some better error
detection mechanism to meet that bound.) Next, AG is reconstructed, and the non-
verifiable packets are identified and also skipped. After that, verification is applied
to every packet that is both decodable and verifiable. After verification of all the
packets, a global decision is made on the authenticity of transmitted multimedia
content. In some applications of stringent security requirement, one may qualify
the content as authentic only when every verified packet passes the authentication.
In other applications, since each packet is weighed, one may consider the content
as authentic as long as the sum of unauthentic packets’ weights does not exceed a
threshold. Besides this basic criterion, it is possible to implement more intelligent
criterion to make the global decision (e.g., [17]).















Figure 3.2. Packetization (together with FEC and SAHC signing) for a) conven-
tional packetization and b) the proposed content-aware packetization.














Figure 3.3. Verification procedure.
Chapter 4
Unequal Authenticity Protection
In this chapter, we discuss UAP – the methodology of allocating authentication
bits to unequally protect the authenticity of packets. We start by deriving an upper
bound of achievable AP in an AG. A method of AG construction that approaches
this achievable AP is discussed, followed by Multi-layer Unequal Chaining – one AG
construction that realizes the notion of UAP. Finally, we formulate the optimization
problem and present the proposed bit allocation procedure.
4.1 Upper Bound of AP
As discussed in Section 2.2, generally the more hash-chains each node has, the
higher the AP. We would like to characterize this relationship quantitatively. Also
remember that ξmin is used as a AP measure of the entire AG. We would like to
firstly derive the upper bound of ξmin. We only consider memoryless packet loss
for the upper bound. It is experimentally verified that bursty packet loss always
18














Figure 4.1. Illustration of the AG with two nodes Pj and Pk having one common
hash-chained node Pc.
leads to worse AP. The analysis of AP leads to the following theorems:
Lemma 4.1. Let Pj and Pk be any two nodes in the AG, then:
Pr(ΛjΛk) ≥ Pr(Λj)Pr(Λk) (4.1)
where Λj is the event that Pj is verifiable. The equality holds when Λj and Λk are
independent.
Proof. For any two nodes Pj and Pk in the AG, they may or may not have common
hash-chained nodes. In case of the later, the events Λj and Λk are independent
of each other, and therefore Eq. (4.1) holds with equality. The case that they
have one common nodes are illustrated in Fig. 4.1. From Eq. (2.1) we can show
Pr(Λc−1|Λc) > Pr(Λc−1) and Pr(Λc−2|Λc−1) > Pr(Λc−2) (where Pc−1 is Pc’s hash
chained packet and so on). Hence, we can show Pr(Λc−2|Λc) > Pr(Λc−2). As such,
we can prove Pr(Λj|Λc) > Pr(Λj) and Pr(Λk|Λc) > Pr(Λk). The last equation
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leads to Pr(Λc|Λk) > Pr(Λc). Therefore, we have Pr(Λj|Λk) > Pr(Λj), which is
equivalent to Pr(ΛjΛk) > Pr(Λj)Pr(Λk).







where e is the packet loss rate, and m is the number of the succeeding nodes of that
node.
Proof. Consider the case that Pj and Pk are the two succeeding nodes of Pi. In
case of memoryless packet loss, the event Λj and Πj are independent. From Eq.
(2.1),
ξi = Pr(ΛjΠj + ΛkΠk)
= Pr(ΛjΠj) + Pr(ΛkΠk)− Pr(ΛjΠjΛkΠk)




ξi ≤ Pr(Λj)Pr(Πj) + Pr(Λk)Pr(Πk)
− Pr(Λj)Pr(Λk)Pr(Πj)Pr(Πk)
= 1− (1− Pr(Λj)Pr(Πj)) (1− Pr(Λk)Pr(Πk))
= 1− (1− ξjPr(Πj)) (1− ξkPr(Πk)) .
(4.4)
That is, ξi is optimal when the dependency of Λj and Λk are fully de-correlated.
We further assume the packet loss rate e is the same for every node, i.e., Pr(Πj) =
Pr(Πk) = ... = 1− e. In addition, since we are interested in finding ξmin, the best
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In general, when Pi have m succeeding nodes, the optimal AP can be found by
solving Eq. (4.2).
4.2 AG construction
After obtaining ξopt, we need to find a method of constructing AG which can
approach this bound. Here we consider a group of packets that share one signature.
Since the signature packet Psig is of primary importance, we would like to protect
it with strong FEC. In this work, for simplicity, we assume that Psig is always
received (which is also the assumption of all other SAHC schemes). Therefore, the
packets directly chained to Psig have AP of 1. We call these packets Pilot Packet.
Usually for each group the number of pilot packets Mpp are preset so that the size
of Psig is fixed.
From Section 4.1, we have seen that in order to achieve the optimal AP, we
must de-correlate the dependency between packets. This can be achieved in either
a deterministic or a statistical manner. In [11], Perrig et al. have adopted an
statistical approach (EMSS) to examine the dominant factors influencing APs.
One of their main findings is that it is highly probable to construct a good AG by
randomly choosing the chaining scheme. In this work, we extend their approach.
We follow their notations to use [a, b, c] to denote the scheme in which packet
Pi is hash-chained to packet Pi+a, Pi+b and Pi+c, where a, b and c are called
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Figure 4.2. Comparisons of APs constructed by schemes [11, 23, 47], [11, 25, 50]
and [5, 25, 50].
chaining distance. We empirically find that it is easy to construct a good AG
by making the chaining distances relatively prime with each other. For example,
Fig. 4.2 illustrates the performance of chaining schemes [11, 23, 47], [11, 25, 50] and
[5, 25, 50] (packet loss rate e = 0.4, number of simulations = 1000).
It is observed that for a good scheme, the APs can be maintained at a constant
level no matter how far away the packets are from the signature packet (e.g., scheme
[11, 23, 47] of Fig. 4.2). This fact supports our assumption that ξmin = ξi = ξj =
ξk = ... = ξopt. We call the scheme is stable if it has this property. In general,
a scheme’s stability varies with the packet loss rate e. If a scheme is stable for
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Figure 4.3. Equi-stability diagram of schemes for various m and e.
e ≤ 0.5, we say the scheme’s stable region is [0, 0.5]. Intuitively, a good scheme has
the ability of statistically de-correlating the dependence between packets. However,
since the correlation cannot be fully reduced to 0, the effect of dependence prevails
when the packet loss rate is high. In the following experiment, we use the variance
of AP’s to measure the stability. Fig. 4.3 shows the equi-stability lines of some
chosen schemes for m = 2 to 6. The area to the left of the equi-stability lines is the
stable region. Another finding is that for schemes of the same number of succeeding
packets, the achievable AP is bounded by their maximum chaining distance (but
much less related to the rest chaining distances). Fig. 4.4 illustrates this property
(e = 0.35, number of simulations = 1000). The maximum chaining distance also
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Figure 4.4. Comparisons of APs constructed by schemes [1, 2, 3], [1, 2, 47] and
[45, 46, 47].
determines the number of pilot packets, and in turn, the size of the signature packet.
In practice, the maximum chaining distance can be firstly chosen according to the
allowable packet size, followed by the choice of other chaining distances.
In Fig. 4.5, we compare the performance of some selected schemes for each
m with the upper bound of ξmin (within the stable region only). We plot the
probability that a packet is not verifiable, i.e., (1− ξopt) in the log scale for better
illustration. The results show that under this statistical approach, the selected
schemes are able to achieve the optimal AP in most of the cases. It is worth noting
that in [11], Perrig et al. have proposed the idea of using Information Dispersal
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Figure 4.5. Comparisons between average AP obtained from Eq. (4.2) and from
simulation results.
Algorithm (IDA) to further improve APs. However, in this method, the number of
pilot packets (and thus the size of the signature packet) is undesirably increased.
In this work, we will adopt the basic scheme for simplicity.
Up to this stage, we have essentially derived a quantitative relationship between
the optimal AP (ξopt) and the authentication overhead (m), as in Eq. (4.2). This
expression is significant, since given the channel condition e and the required AP,
we can quantitatively compute the hash overhead needed to achieve this AP. We
have also identified some schemes of AG construction to achieve this optimal AP.
However, we notice that these schemes produce equal APs for all packets. In
order to produce packets of unequal APs, one solution is to group packets and use
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P4,1 P4,2 P4,3 ... ...L4
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Figure 4.6. Structure of the MUC AG.
different m’s for different groups.
We propose to construct AG with controllable unequal APs – Multi-layer Un-
equal Chaining (MUC). Fig. 4.6 illustrates the structure of MUC. In MUC, the
packets are organized in multiple layers. In layer Li, each packet is hash-chained
to i other succeeding packets based on the chaining schemes described above. For
each layer, there are some pilot packets which are directly chained to the signature
packet Psig. Each layer is similar to the construction of equal APs described above,
and the APs can be computed by Eq. (4.2) for each layer. We let fixed fraction of
packets to be the pilot packets (e.g., 5%) so that the signature packet size is also
fixed.
Another point to note is that it is undesirable to chain packets across different
layers. For example, it appears that we could chain lower-layer (LL) packets to
higher-layer (HL) packets to further improve the LL packets’ APs. However, this
will create the LL packets’ dependence to HL packets. As a result, the loss of a HL
packet becomes more expensive since it now also influences the LL packets’ AP.
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Therefore, it is better to leave each layer unchained with one another.
4.3 Optimal Bit Allocation
The optimal authentication bit allocation problem can be formulated as follows.
Within an AG, we have M packets, and each packet Pi has a weight Wi. Given an
overall authentication bit budget (i.e., the average hash chains per packet m), we



















for i = 1, 2, ...M . Note that m is related to the total number of authentication bits
as:
B · ra = Lh ·Mm (4.9)
where B · ra represents the total number of bits allocated for authentication (see
Section 5.1 for more details), Lh is the number of bits for each hash (for SHA-1,
Lh is equal to 160).
We notice that it is difficult to obtain an analytical solution for this optimization
problem since the relationship between ξi and mi is transcendental. However, since
mi’s take only integer values, it is possible to find the solution by exhaustively
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searching through all possible combinations of packet assignment to layers. The
steps for optimal bit allocation are listed as follows.
1) Select l, the number of layers for the MUC AG. Note that the choice of l is
a design issue. The higher the l, the larger the searching range, and thus the
more probable of obtaining a global optimal value; in the mean time, more
iterations of searches are required, and thus it increases the computational
overhead.
2) Select Mpp, the number of pilot packets within an AG. Again, the choice of
Mpp is a design issue. The larger the Mpp, the better the de-correlation effect.
However, the signature packet size would increase accordingly. Although in
practice, we can split the signature packet into several and transmit, it is
nevertheless undesirable to have too huge signature packet size. Therefore,
one needs to choose a proper Mpp to balance all factors. We have experimen-
tally found that setting Mpp to be 3 ∼ 5 % of total number of packets is a
good choice.
3) Sort all the packets Pi’s in descending order according to the weight Wi’s.
Assign the first Mpp packets to the pilot packets. Since the pilot packets
are directly chained to the signature packet, the associated APs are 1. In
addition, each of the pilot packets consumes one hash chain from the budget.
4) For the rest of the bit budget to be assigned to the other packets, iterate all
possible combinations of packet assignment for each layer; in each iteration,
compute
∑M
i=1Wiξi. The number of iterations can be reduced by using the
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empirical observation that packets with larger weight deserve better protec-
tion, and therefore they should be put in higher layers.
5) Choose the maximum
∑M
i=1Wiξi and the corresponding combination of packet
assignment.
In Fig. 4.7, we present the bit allocation experimental results for mandrill im-
age (refer to Chapter 6 for the detailed experiment settings). Fig. 4.7 a) illustrates
ξopt against m under some packet loss rate e for i) UAP and ii) EMSS (which
implements basic equal protection). It is clearly shown that UAP has better per-
formance than the basic EMSS. In Fig. 4.7 b), we compare the analytical results
based on the optimal bit allocation algorithm, and the simulation results. We can
see that the analytical results are very close to that of simulation.
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b)
Figure 4.7. Simulation results: a) comparison between UAP and basic EMSS,
b) comparsion between the analytical results through the optimal bit allocation
algorithm and the simulation results.
Chapter 5
Joint Resource Allocation with
Source and Channel Coding
In the previous chapter, we presented UAP, which unequally allocate resources
to achieve an optimal authentication result. If we are given precise source and
channel coding models, we are able to jointly consider this optimization problem
with source coding and channel coding (refer to the JSCA Analysis module in
Fig. 3.1). Apparently the resources are allocated for achieving two objectives:
i) source and channel coding bits for minimizing the end-to-end distortion, and
ii) authentication bits for maximizing an average AP. However, notice that AP
determines the probability that a packet is non-verifiable, which should be skipped
during reconstruction. Since the skip will result in distortions to the multimedia
content, we may find that it is possible to unify the two objectives into one single
form, i.e., minimizing the end-to-end distortion resulted from quantization in source
coding, channel distortion, and non-verifiability in authentication. In this chapter,
31
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we firstly discuss the rate and distortion models for source and channel coding.
After that, one necessary step for joint optimization – the estimation of ξopt – will
be discussed. Finally, we will formulate the joint optimization problem and discuss
how it can be achieved.
5.1 Rate and Distortion Models
5.1.1 Overall Rate and Distortion Models
We consider that the coded multimedia content consists of M sources, each is
coded in one network packet. The overall bit budget for coding these packets is
(B + BF ), where B is the number of bits subjected to JSCA resource allocation
scheme, and BF is the fixed overhead, including bits for control signals, redundancy
for error-resilient coding such as CRC and synchronization mark, as well as the
signature packet. We can denote the code rate for source coding, channel coding
and authentication by rs, rc and ra respectively, subjected to rs + rc + ra = 1.
In typical transform coding, each coefficient is quantized independently. The
overall distortion is exactly the summation of the distortion at each source. Fur-
thermore, each source has differentiated contribution to the reconstructed quality.
We use the term energy gain, denoted by Gi, to represent this difference. This term
originates from JPEG2000 standard [18], and here we generalize it to any type of
media. For more specific needs in practice, energy gain can be defined based on
Region of Interest (ROI) (e.g., transmission of the suspect’s portrait, where the
face is the ROI). The probability for an authentic packet Pi to be decodable and
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verifiable is ξi(1 − e). In this case, the distortion is merely due to source coding,
denoted by Ds,i. If the packet is either non-decodable or non-verifiable, the distor-
tion is denoted by Dr,i, which depends on the specific error-concealment scheme.
Here we consider to set the values to 0’s when a packet is either non-decodable or
non-verifiable. Therefore, Dr,i equals to the sum squared value of coefficients in













Achieving a global optimization of E[D] is difficult and expensive, since one has to
consider the interacting factors from source coding, channel coding and authenti-
cation all together. A more practical but suboptimal solution is to firstly consider
overall resource allocation among source coding, channel coding and authentication,
followed by optimal resource allocation within each of them. Consider splitting E[D]
into two parts:















is the distortion due to channel error and authentication non-verifiability. Bit
allocation within source coding can usually be done analytically (e.g., using the
classical R-D model in [19]). In cases when the quantization scheme is fixed (e.g.
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JPEG), bit allocation is not necessary. To optimize E[Dca], let Wi = Gi(Dr,i−Ds,i),















In order to achieve overall resource allocation to optimize E[D], we need to esti-
mate the value of ξopt, but without actually performing the UAP procedure. This
problem is dealt with in Section 5.2.
5.1.2 Source Coding Models
For source coding, we need to find R-D relationship of the given multimedia con-
tent, i.e., a quantitative relationship between B · rs and Ds must be derived. In
this work, we adopt the ρ-domain R-D analysis algorithm proposed in [20, 21] to
estimate the source coding R-D curve. In their work, He et al. have discovered
an invariant linear property between the source coding rate R and ρ, which is the
percentage of zeros among the quantized transform coefficients. The rate R and
distortion D can both be considered as functions of ρ. By exploiting the linear
relationship of R and ρ, we can achieve accurate rate control for source coding
under very low complexity. Another advantage of this analytical model is that it
makes overall JSCA analysis trackable in terms of rate allocation among source
coding, channel coding and authentication. We have implemented this model in
our JSCA system for a progressive JPEG coder (refer to Chapter 6).
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5.1.3 Channel and Channel Coding Models
For channel model, we have assumed a BSC parametered by SER ε. We use
a (N ,K) Reed-Solomon (RS) block code with 8 bits per symbol to protect the



























1, if i+ j ≤ T
(K − i)/K, otherwise
(5.9)
For simplicity of estimation, assume each packet has lp symbols, we have
lp =
B(1− rc)
8 ·M . (5.10)
CRC is applied to detect errors within a packet. The probability that there is
error(s) in a packet (i.e., the packet loss rate) is
e = 1− (1− εd)lp . (5.11)
5.1.4 Authentication Models
In Chapter 4, we have developed UAP – the methodology for allocating authen-
tication bits to unequally protect the authenticity of packets. To summarize, the
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authentication model has been shown in Eq. (4.7) and Eq. (4.8). In addition,
the relationship between the average number of hash chains per packet m and the
total number of bits allocated for authentication B · ra is shown in Eq. (4.9). As
discussed earlier, Eq. (4.8) is an accurate estimate of the relationship between
the authentication overhead and AP. We expect to achieve accurate control of the
resource allocation for optimized end-to-end multimedia quality by incorporating
this authentication model, together with the source and channel models mentioned
in Section 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, respectively.
5.2 Estimation of ξopt Through Look-Up Table
In this section, we discuss how to estimate ξopt without actually performing UAP.
We have experimentally discovered an invariant property among ξopt, the packet
loss rate e, the average hash chains per packet m¯, and a normalized cumulative
weight function φ(i), illustrated as follows. Remember that in Step 3) of the UAP
bit allocation procedure, the packets are sorted according to the weight Wi’s. We














where W1,W2, ...WM are in descending order. We have found that two sources
having similar φ(i) also have similar ξopt(e, m¯). We choose two sources aerial and
cafe that have similar φ(i), and another source medpic of very different φ(i), as
shown in Fig. 5.1 a). The corresponding function ξopt(e, m¯) is shown in Fig. 5.1
b). It has clearly demonstrated that the ξopt(e, m¯) curves of source aerial and cafe
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are also similar, while the curve of source medpic is very different. We have tested
various sources and this relationship holds for all. In addition, we found that φ(i)
can be modeled by an asymptote curve passing through points (0, 0) and (M, 1),
parametered by its curvature. We have selected 16 images for examining the curve
fitting accuracy, as shown in Fig. 5.2. Fig. 5.3 presents a comparison between the
actual φ(i) curve and the fitted asymptote curve passing through (0, 0) and (M, 1)
for the 16 test images.
We propose the empirical algorithm for estimating ξopt as follows. For each
curvature value of the φ(i) curve (which takes continuous values, but we can only
take some discrete values and use interpolation to find the rest), we compute
the corresponding values of ξopt(e, m¯) and store them in a look-up table. The
estimation of ξopt simply becomes a table look-up operation. The overall resource
allocation among source channel coding and authentication can be performed based
on this table look-up operation.
5.3 Joint Optimization
Given any input multimedia content, we firstly estimate the source coding R-D
curve based on the ρ-domain analysis described in [20]. We also need to find its
normalized cumulative weight function φ(i), and then use least square curve fitting
to find the curvature of the fitted asymptote curve. With this value, we can then
obtain the numerical relationship of ξopt(e, m¯) from the look-up table (if necessary,
interpolation is performed). The optimal inter-BA problem is formulated as in
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Eq. (5.13). This optimization can be achieved through searching the optimization
parameters rs and rc within the region of 0 ≤ rs, rc ≤ 1 and rs + rc ≤ 1 in the
(rs, rc) plane. In this work, we have implemented a simple algorithm for finding
the global optimal pair (rs, rc) through exhaustive search. In our future work,
we will explore more efficient optimization algorithms to achieve lower complexity.
Once the optimal (rs, rc) is found, the source code rate, channel code rate and
authentication rate are determined. The rest of the coding and packetization steps
are performed as demonstrated in Fig. 3.1.
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e=0.1, 0.3, 0.5 
b)
Figure 5.1. a) Normalized cumulative weight function φ(i) and b) average weighted
AP ξopt(e, m¯) for sources aerial, cafe and medpic.
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Figure 5.2. The 16 test images.
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Figure 5.3. Comparison between the actual φ(i) curve and the fitted asymptote
















We have implemented the proposed joint coding and authentication system on
a JPEG coder operating in the progressive mode. We describe the experiment
settings in the next subsection, followed by the presentation and discussions of
the experimental results. Note that since the security of authentication is ensured
by the underlying cryptographic SAHC scheme, we mainly focus on examining
the performance of our proposed framework from a rate-distortion point of view
through experiments.
6.1 Implementation Settings
For all the experiments in this work, we have selected 16 gray-level test images of
size 512× 512 as the input source, shown in Fig. 5.2.
42
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The JPEG coder works in the spectral selection progressive mode. That is,
after block-based DCT transform, the DCT coefficients are rearranged and coded
such that the coefficients in low-frequency subbands of the zig-zag order are sent
first. This operation mode helps to differentiate the relative importance of packets,
because the coefficients in lower frequency subbands always contribute more to the
reconstructed quality. Codestream obtained from encoding coefficients in several
8 × 8 blocks (in this following experiments, the default is 4) is packetized into
one content packet. The source coding R-D curve is estimated using the ρ-domain
analysis algorithm described in [20]. Specifically, 6 points in the R-D curve is firstly
estimated, and the rest is obtained by interpolation. For channel coding, we do not
implement the down-to-ground RS coding schemes since it is not the main concern
in this work. Instead, we compute the packet loss rate e from the channel SER
based on Eq. (5.6) ∼ (5.11). The channel code block size N is set to 200. For
MUC AG construction, the number of layers l is set to 4, and the number of pilot
packet is set to 5%. The hash function used is SHA-1, which has hash length Lh
equal to 160 bits.
6.2 Results and Discussions
6.2.1 R-D curves at different SERs
We plot the end-to-end R-D curves for image lena and mandrill at SER equal to
0.3 and 0.01. The proposed resource allocation scheme (JSCA+UAP) is bench-
marked against two other schemes: i) JSCA+EMSS, in which the overall resource
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allocation is performed between source channel coding and authentication, but the
resource within authentication is equally allocated using the basic EMSS scheme.
ii) JSC+EMSS, in which the resource for source and channel coding is jointly al-
located whereas that for authentication is fixed, and the basic EMSS is applied.
Fig. 6.1 shows that in each of the cases, JSCA+UAP always has the best R-D
curve, outperforming the other two schemes by around 3 dB on average. Note that
JSCA+EMSS also outperforms JSC+EMSS, especially when the channel distor-
tion is severe.
6.2.2 Subjective Quality of Reconstructed Images
We also compare the subjective quality of the reconstructed images in Fig. 6.2.
lena and mandrill are examined under the same channel condition and overall rate
for JSCA+UAP, JSCA+EMSS and JSC+EMSS, respectively. From Fig. 6.2, the
subjective quality differences are very distinguishable. Similar subjective differ-
ences can also be easily observed in the other test images.
6.2.3 Source code, channel code and authentication rate at
various SERs
To examine how the JSCA resource allocation is affected by the channel condition,
we fix the overall code rate and examine how rs, rc and ra vary, as the SER
increases from 0.001 to 0.4. TABLE 6.1 and TABLE 6.2 illustrates the results for
lena and mandrill, respectively. From the tables, we observe that when the channel
condition is good, channel coding is unnecessary and most of the bits are allocated
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Figure 6.1. End-to-end R-D curves. a) lena at SER = 0.3 (ra = 0.25 for
JSC+EMSS). b) lena at SER = 0.01 (ra = 0.4 for JSC+EMSS). c) mandrill
at SER = 0.3 (ra = 0.25 for JSC+EMSS). d) mandrill at SER = 0.01 (ra = 0.4
for JSC+EMSS).
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a) b) c)
d) e) f)
Figure 6.2. Subjective image quality tests. a) lena, JSCA+UAP, SER = 0.3, rate
= 1.0bpp, PSNR = 30.7442 dB. b) lena, JSCA+EMSS, SER = 0.3, rate = 1.0bpp,
PSNR = 28.8318 dB. c) lena, JSC+EMSS, SER = 0.3, rate = 1.0bpp, PSNR =
26.4677 dB. d) mandrill, JSCA+UAP, SER = 0.3, rate = 5.0bpp, PSNR = 25.5515
dB. e) mandrill, JSCA+EMSS, SER = 0.3, rate = 5.0bpp, PSNR = 22.5029 dB.
f) mandrill, JSC+EMSS, SER = 0.3, rate = 5.0bpp, PSNR = 21.0014 dB.
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Table 6.1. Source Code / Channel Code / Authentication Rate vs. SER for lena
(rate= 2.5bpp)
SER 0.001 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
rs 0.57 0.55 0.48 0.36 0.20 0.12 0.06
rc 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.36 0.60 0.78 0.91
ra 0.43 0.37 0.30 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.03
PSNR(dB) 46.3473 44.7786 42.2841 39.7409 36.5461 33.736 30.2107
Table 6.2. Source Code / Channel Code / Authentication Rate vs. SER for
mandrill (rate= 2.5bpp)
SER 0.001 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
rs 0.60 0.53 0.45 0.39 0.26 0.15 0.07
rc 0.00 0.07 0.21 0.34 0.56 0.75 0.90
ra 0.40 0.40 0.34 0.27 0.18 0.10 0.03
PSNR(dB) 31.9815 30.9958 29.5383 28.2261 25.5697 23.4941 21.2831
for source coding and authentication. When the channel condition is poor, the
large portion of bits are allocated for channel coding. As expected, the PSNR of
reconstructed image decreases as SER increases.
6.2.4 R-D curve at various packet sizes
We vary the parameter of how many 8× 8 blocks to code into a packet to see how
the R-D curve would be affected. Their results are benchmarked against the case of
JSC, where all bits are used for source and channel coding and no authentication is
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Figure 6.3. End-to-end R-D curves at various packet size for a) lena and b) man-
drill. JSC is the case when no authentication is performed.
performed. From Fig. 6.3, we can see that the R-D curve approaches that of JSC
when more blocks are coded in one packet. The reason behind this observation
is that as the number of blocks for each packet increases, the authentication cost
– the hash of length Lh is amortized by more blocks. Therefore, the excessive
bits can now be used for source and channel coding. However, the payoff is that
the resolution for localizing a tampered block is now reduced, and also that the
possibility of suffering from jitters is increased.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this work, we have adopted a content-aware stream-level approach for authenti-
cating multimedia content delivered over wireless networks. We have been focusing
on how to design the joint coding and authentication system in order to achieve
optimized authentication results and end-to-end reconstruction quality. The main
contributions of this work can be summarized as follows. First, we have intro-
duced the novel concept of UAP to offer a more ideal solution for protecting mul-
timedia stream from channel noise and intrusion than traditional content-blind
equal-protection schemes. Second, to substantiate the idea of UAP, we have math-
ematically formulated the quantitative relationship between the resource budget
and the achievable AP, as well as a practical AG construction scheme that realizes
unequal protections. Third, we have shown how to integrate UAP with specific
source and channel models to obtain an optimal end-to-end quality by means of
JSCA analysis. Finally, we have realized the joint coding and authentication sys-
tem on a progressive JPEG coder to prove that the proposed approach can be
49
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implemented successfully. Note that we have assumed generalized multimedia for-
mat during this work. Therefore, the proposed framework can be readily applied to
other media coders, such as audio, image and video coders. Future work could be
done to extend the analysis and implementations to the state-of-art video coders,
including H.264 and scalable video coders (SVCs).
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